was from Pennsylvania and officially an officer with the Federal Army, when the Civil War broke out in 1861 he chose to remain in the South.
Josiah Gorgas was at once commissioned as brigadier of the Confederate Army and made Chief of Ordnance. William Gorgas, seven years old when the war broke out, was often present when his father met with Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and other Confederate leaders.That exciting life at such an impressionable age no doubt seeded his desire to follow his father in a military career.When it later proved impossible for him to obtain an appointment to West Point, he chose the medical corps as his way into the Army, even though he had shown no interest in medicine as a young man. In 1876 Gorgas enrolled in the Bellevue Medical College in New York City. He received his degree in June 1879. After spending a year as interne at Bellevue Hospital, he entered the medical department of the U.S. Army, thus realizing his childhood dream.
Fort Brown was one of several military posts in Texas at which Gorgas served. From there his military career took him to Florida, the West, the Dakotas, and the old Indian Territory. He was supplied with medical journals and books and was one of the first American surgeons to practice aseptic surgery. In yellow fever epidemics he served as undertaker, gravedigger, and even clergyman: so great was the fear of contagion that those normally responsible for these services kept their distance. In 1898 he finally realized the kind of responsibility he had hoped to find in the Army when he was appointed chief sanitary officer for Havana. Gorgas' immunity to yellow fever added to his credentials for the job. Havana was considered one of the worst foci of yellow fever in the hemisphere, and some historians claim that one of the major reasons the United States sought to gain control of Cuba was to eliminate this focus.
Prevailing belief had it that yellow fever was carried from one area to another by fomites, i.e., personal belongings or merchandise on which the infection was purportedly carried. Gorgas himself strongly inclined to this theory (Gorgas 1902 ). However, not everyone was in agreement. William Nott, the physician who attended Gorgas' birth in Mobile, for one, believed that yellow fever was due to tiny insects that floated around in "miasmatic mists" (Humphreys 1992) . When he arrived in Havana, Gorgas was probably as ignorant of Nott's theory as he was of a comparable theory held by the Cuban physician Carlos J. Finlay, whom Gorgas befriended quite soon after arriving there. For 20 years Finlay had been preaching that it was the Stegomyia (now known as Aëdes aegypti) mosquito that transmitted yellow fever. Unfortunately, he was never able to demonstrate it. Not one of the more than a hundred attempts to pass yellow fever from an infected person to a healthy one via the bite of mosquitoes of that species had produced a confirmed case of the disease. Both Finlay and Nott were totally disregarded by their medical colleagues.
Gorgas launched a major clean-up of Havana to rid the city of all obvious sources of fomites. In a few months American newspapers and magazines were publishing dramatic "before and after" photographs, displaying streets that were as clean as any that could be found in the world. No filth was overlooked. As fantastic an effort as this was, however, the results were equally fantastic-but in a totally opposed manner. Havana was hit with an epidemic that some claimed was the worst the island had ever known.The local inhabitants, who had to put up with Gorgas' teams of cleaners, took perverse pleasure in pointing out that the parts of the city that were cleanest were precisely the ones where the epidemic raged with the greatest intensity.
In June 1900, the Surgeon General appointed a commission to visit Cuba to determine what had caused this epidemic. So many yellow fever commissions had been undertaken in the course of the 19th century that one more did not attract anyone's interest. However, this commission had several factors in its favor that would make it one of the more outstanding ones in the history of public health.The commission's leader,Walter Reed, was not only a brilliant physician, but he was an up-to-date one. In particular, he knew of the very recent studies that had shown malaria to be a disease transmitted by mosquitoes.The team also had the services of Henry R. Carter, a physician who earlier had carried out studies in Mississippi that showed that visitors to patients sick with yellow fever only came down with the disease if they visited after two weeks or so following the onset of the disease. When Reed learned of this fact, he thought immediately of an insect host. In fact, Carter's work more impressed Reed "with the importance of an intermediate host than everything else put together" (Mullan 1989) . What insect could it be? Finlay's mosquitoes, of course, were the logical ones to begin with, and he always a plentiful supply on hand. In 1901 Reed acknowledged that Finlay "must be given full credit for the theory of the propagation of yellow fever by means of the mosquito" (Strode 1951 ).
Gorgas was not involved in the work of Reed's commission, although he followed its results closely. He did not immediately drop the idea that yellow fever might be caused by means other than mosquitoes (Truby 1943) . Even experts from around the world who came to see what Reed and his team had accomplished remained skeptical, but their skepticism was already beginning to yield. When a glass jar containing mosquitoes accidentally lost its cover during a meeting of about 15 "learned" but dubious doctors, nearly all the visiting savants leaped for the door and exited the room as quickly as they could.
Reed's results suggested two courses of action: isolate the sick so that mosquitoes could not bite them, or destroy all mosquitoes. Gorgas did not rule out the first course, but he knew it would not be sufficient, since plenty of mild cases of yellow fever were never reported, and thousands of disease-carrying children hardly knew they were afflicted at all. Reed, on the other hand, did not think that getting rid of the mosquitoes was at all possible, but this was the key method Gorgas opted for.
Not much was then known about the Stegomyia-not even the fact that most of the mosquitoes flying around Havana were not members of that family. This fact was learned very quickly, as was the fact that the Stegomyia have rather par-ticular breeding habits.They lay their eggs only in clean water near human habitation, and they prefer freshly fallen rainwater that, in Havana, could be found in the barrels used by nearly all families to capture clean drinking water. Pans and dishes would do as well for breeding, but not puddles, ditches, swamps, or any of the breeding sites preferred by the malaria-carrying mosquito, for example.This explains why Gorgas' first efforts had not only failed but also had exacerbated the problem. By cleaning up Havana, he had inadvertently created more suitable breeding sites than had previously existed in the city.
Gorgas divided the city into districts, and in a brief time he had a complete record of every house and every family, a record in which he noted the number of water barrels, tanks, jugs, and other container for a population nearly totaling 300,000 people. It is at this point that one can begin to appreciate the uniqueness of Gorgas' administrative abilities. It was one thing to have such a list; it was another to use it in such a way that the population would comply with his regulations.
All water-containing objects had to be covered in such a manner as to prevent mosquitoes from getting through to lay their eggs. Every house, hotel and barroom, and other inhabited building was visited once a month to see that the regulations were being obeyed. Anyone who permitted breeding on their premises was fined 10 dollars. Everyone had to account for each container on the inspectors' list; every building was searched thoroughly.
Gorgas roamed the streets and alleys of Havana. He stopped to talk with housewives, delivering short lectures to explain why his inspectors were asking them to do such apparently silly but nevertheless time-consuming things. His message got through. Using every means at his command to persuade rather than impose, he gained the residents' confidence and support. Dramatically, and much faster than anticipated, the results of their joint efforts bore fruit.
From 1762 to 1901, there had never been a day when yellow fever was not present in Havana, and more than 500 deaths to the disease had been counted in each of the preceding 10 years. In 1896, there had been 1,282 deaths. Gorgas started his work in March 1901. In July and August 1901 there were five deaths. It was 18 years before another yellow fever death was to occur.
Reed wrote to Gorgas: "The news from Havana is simply delightful. . . .That you have succeeded in throttling the epidemic appears beyond question and it is to your everlasting credit.A man of less discretion, enthusiasm, and energy would have made a fiasco of it.Whereas you, my dear Gorgas . . . have rid that pest hole, Havana, of her yellow plague." Gorgas was equally generous in claiming that without Reed's work there would never have been any "practical" way for accomplishing what he had done. His success in eliminating yellow fever in Havana led him to be made, in 1903, assistant Surgeon General, U.S. Army, with the rank of colonel.
While Gorgas was growing up and engaging a career that eventually brought him to Havana, serious efforts were undertaken to realize the nearly 400-year-old dream of crossing what was known as the Panama Isthmus. The discovery of gold in the territory of California in 1848 led the United States to seriously explore the question. A railroad line was built in 1855, but 30 more years would pass before construction of a ship canal was begun, work that was abandoned in 1893.
The French carried out explorations of their own, and for a time they seemed to be winning the race. In 1878 a major international congress took place under the presidency of M. de Lessups, the builder of the Suez Canal, to "consider and pass definitely on the whole question" (Goethals 1915) . Various schemes were proposed and compared, including a sea level canal, which was estimated to cost $240 million and would require 12 years to complete. Some delegates argued for building a canal using the least excavation, since "it is very dangerous to the health of men employed in the works to dig up the earth." Around that time, one of the most prominent theories concerning the infectious origin of disease was "unhealthy soil" (Litsios 2001a) . Cutting into such soil would expose workers to miasma and effluvia that could lead to yellow fever, malaria, or cholera, which then could be spread elsewhere by fomites.
The Panama Canal Company was organized in 1881 under the leadership of de Lessups. Construction was initiated soon after, but the whole scheme collapsed and the company passed into receivership in February 1889. De Lessups had been warned during his first visit in 1881 that "if you try to build this canal, there will not be trees enough on the Isthmus to make the crosses for the graves of your laborers." During the epidemic season, some 30 to 40 funerals took place each day. At one time, 500 young engineers came to work in the swamps and "not one of them lived to draw his first month's pay." These losses were not publicly disclosed. Later, Gorgas calculated from the data he could obtain that the French had lost about one-third of all their white employees-a total, in eight years, of 20,000 lives.The vast majority of those deaths were due to yellow fever.
In 1899, the year following Gorgas' arrival in Havana, Congress authorized the President to make a full and complete investigation of any and all practicable sea routes to California, investigating particularly the Nicaragua and Panama ones. The board established by President McKinley reported in 1901 that the Panama route would be preferable, but the price fixed by the Panama Canal Company for a sale of its property and franchises was judged so unreasonable as to force them to opt for the Nicaragua route. Shortly thereafter, the Province of Panama seceded from Colombia, and the United States immediately recognized the independence of the new republic. A treaty was signed, under which the United States obtained the control and jurisdiction over a strip of land 10 miles wide, measured five miles from either side of the center line of the proposed canal route. The French property was purchased at the sum stipulated, and the United States took possession on 8 May 1904.
The American Medical Association asked to have Gorgas made a member of the Panama Canal Commission that had been established to oversee the building of the canal, but this request was refused. The Commission was wary of any-one who spent time and money on killing mosquitoes, when everyone knew that physicians should be taking care of the sick. And if epidemics did break out, getting rid of the filth and cleaning up the towns would control them. However, the Surgeon General of the Army used his authority to put Gorgas in charge of the sanitary work in the Canal Zone itself, a position not within the immediate jurisdiction of the Canal Commission.
Gorgas made a preliminary visit in March 1904. It was during this visit that he learned from the French how devastating yellow fever and malaria had been to their earlier efforts. He calculated that if the American project were to suffer similar sickness and death rates, it would result in some 13,000 men being constantly in the hospital, with a loss of not far from 3,500 men each year.
The new sanitary team with Gorgas in charge arrived officially in June 1904. Immediately he sensed how different this assignment would be from the one in Havana. His earlier task had been recognized as being of fundamental importance, while in Panama, the only important work to be done was the construction of the canal. Public health was no more understood by the Americans in charge than it had been by the previous French administration. Within a year's time, the Governor of the Zone, to whom Gorgas reported, the Chief Engineer, and members of the executive committee of the Canal Commission united in recommending to the Secretary of War that Gorgas be dismissed. This request was forwarded to President Theodore Roosevelt, who fortunately sought the opinion of his close friend Dr. Alexander Lambert before deciding the issue.
Roosevelt related to Lambert how Gorgas was spending his time "oiling pools and trying to kill mosquitoes," while Panama and Colon "smell as bad as ever." Lambert spent the evening explaining why the smells had nothing to do with disease and how the French had failed because they did not know of the role of the mosquitoes in the transmission of yellow fever and malaria. But, he said, "it is your canal; you must do the choosing, and you must choose to-night whether you are going to build that canal." Roosevelt overruled the Secretary of War and gave his full support to Gorgas.
Lesser men would have abandoned hope during that first year. However, Gorgas knew what had to be done, and he had already demonstrated that his method worked. Even if the Panamanian towns and jungle did not resemble those of Cuba, he knew he could achieve comparable results. Since the treaty with Panama provided that Americans should be in charge of sanitation in Panama City and Colon, the two major towns outside the Canal Zone, Gorgas proceeded to sanitize them as he had Havana (Leonard 1991) .
In the first year he fumigated both towns, using 300 pounds of sulfur and 120 pounds of pyrethrum, the entire year's supply for the whole of the United States and all that he could find on the market. A law was passed making it a misdemeanor, punishable with a fine of five dollars, to have mosquitoes in the larval stage on one's premises. Each city was divided up into districts, each with an inspector in charge. Similar methods to those used in Havana were employed in Panama, with the addition of setting up "traps" to entice mosquitoes to lay their eggs in well-defined water containers whose contents could be periodically emptied. Results were as phenomenal as they had been in Havana: by early 1906 the number of dead began to fall; by September, Gorgas announced that yellow fever had taken its last victim.Yellow fever had again been conquered, but there remained malaria, a disease that Gorgas considered of greater importance and far more difficult to control.
The Anopheles carrier of malaria in Panama differs importantly from the Aëdes carrier of yellow fever. It breeds in ponds, marshes, swamps, and standing water, and is to be found throughout the jungle. Malaria, too, is a different disease. Being sick with malaria affords hardly any immunity.And, although less deadly than yellow fever, it causes severe incapacity. Whole armies have been stopped by malaria. No canal can be built if its workforce is mostly to be found in the hospital wards at all times of the year. The only positive point of difference is that malaria can be treated, while yellow fever cannot. Gorgas made quinine available, but as he had in Havana, he chose to rely primarily on attacking the larval stages of the Anopheles and to eliminate potential breeding sites.
The strategy against the Anopheles was based on the fact that the mosquito's average flight limit was around 200 yards. If all inhabited areas could be kept free of any breeding surface including a surrounding zone of that width, chances of transmission of malaria would be radically reduced. Swamps in the vicinity of the Canal Zone's villages, towns, and inhabited houses were completely drained; nearly 8 million feet of ditches were built for this purpose alone. All underbrush was cut, and the grass when it reached the height of one foot was removed. This exposed the Anopheles to sunlight and wind, neither one favorable to its survival. The ground was leveled to remove all natural watery depressions that could serve as breeding places. In addition, all habitation in the Zone was thoroughly screened with 18-mesh copper wire screening.
Hundreds of workers were engaged to eliminate mosquito larvae. Kerosene and crude oil were used to cover watery surfaces. Oil carts sprinkled the deadly substance onto roadside ditches. Small larvae-loving fish were bred and introduced into ponds and other sizable water sources. Just enough seawater was introduced into fresh-water pools to raise their salinity to a level where the Anopheles larvae and pupae could not survive. Many other highly specific methods were used with varying degrees of success.
Malaria did not disappear from the Zone, but there was a steady decrease in malaria cases and deaths over a period of 10 years. Gorgas felt that the reduction would have been faster and reached lower levels had the engineers and Commission members fully cooperated with instead of just tolerating him. As it was, the number of canal workers admitted to hospitals for malaria dropped from 821 per 1,000 in 1906, to 76 per 1,000 in 1913. More impressively, Gorgas' campaign had resulted in the overall death rate for the Canal Zone falling from 15.3 per 1,000 in 1905, to 6 per 1,000 in 1914. At that time the general death rate of the United States was 14.1 per 1,000. Gorgas had made the Zone one of the world's healthiest places to live.
While successfully battling disease in Panama, Gorgas traveled to preach the importance of "tropical medicine." In 1909, using his position as president of the American Society of Tropical Medicine, he pressed for an American civilian institute of research and training in tropical medicine (Farley 1991) . His speech to the business leaders of New Orleans in 1911 led to the United Fruit Company's immediately granting $5,000 per year for five years to establish a chair in tropical medicine in the city.The opening of the first American School of Tropical Medicine in Tulane University followed.
Shortly after Gorgas left the Canal, in November 1913, President Woodrow Wilson appointed him Surgeon General of the Army. Congress made him a Major General, at that time the highest rank ever given to a Surgeon General (Gillett 1995) . Gorgas was soon deeply involved in expanding the medical capacity of the U.S. Army to prepare for its possible entry into World War I. He called upon his wide network of friends to help him obtain the best advice available. For example, he asked William H. Welch to serve as liaison between America's medical laboratories and the army, for which Welch, at age 67, was appointed in 1917 as a major in the Medical Section of the Officers' Reserve Corps (Flexner and Flexner 1941) . And Charles V. Chapin, another leading public health specialist of the time, was asked to advise on how to supply the army with foods which were healthful but cheap. His book The Sources and Modes of Infection became the standard guide for medical officers (Cassedy 1962) .
Despite his heavy responsibilities, Gorgas found time in 1916 to accept the invitation of the Rockefeller Foundation to spend several months visiting countries in South and Central America to advise on the formation of comprehensive plans for the struggle against yellow fever. There was growing concern among Far East countries that the opening of the Panama Canal would lead to yellow fever being introduced into that area (Fosdick 1952) . Gorgas concluded that yellow fever could be "eradicated from the face of the earth within a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost," and that the Foundation could not undertake a more rewarding activity. He was appointed director of the Foundation's International Health Division's (IHD) yellow fever control program, a job that he could only take upon his mandatory retirement from the U.S. Army, three days following the signing of the Armistice.
Six months of control in 1919 had eliminated yellow fever from Guayaquil, Ecuador, but this was followed by new outbreaks in other South and Central American countries (Williams 1969). Gorgas' attention turned to West Africa, where little was known about the disease beyond the recognition that it had originated from that region several centuries earlier. The IHD established a Commission in 1920 that was to set sail from London. But Gorgas, then 66 years old, collapsed from a paralytic stroke and died on 4 July 1920.
Shortly before his death, King George V personally presented Gorgas the In 1928 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives held hearings to consider authorization of a permanent annual appropriation for the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory. Speaker followed speaker to celebrate Gorgas' memory and legacy. Lister Hill, a congressional representative from Gorgas' home state of Alabama, noted that "France has her Louis Pasteur, England has her Joseph Lister, but America has her William Crawford Gorgas." Dr Franklin Martin, president of the Gorgas Memorial Institute compared the Gorgas' genius with Lister and Edison, and observed that "each of these men . . . wrought miracles from the commonplace materials which were at hand, the real significance of which was not recognized either by his contemporaries or his predecessors."
One visiting physician told an anecdote that captures well the methods of Gorgas. On finding two mosquitoes in his apartment one night, he telephoned the sanitary inspector of that district to report his discovery. In "several minutes" the inspector arrived with five assistants.They searched the whole house, found the mosquitoes, and examined them to determine their species. Noting that it was "a kind of mosquito that flew against the wind, and always bred in shallow wet places," they called for more men and equipment. The wire screening was examined and repaired. The inspector got on a motorcycle, which he had brought on the truck, and using a map of the neighborhood went off to search for possible breeding places upwind. On the second day they found "a little place where a water pipe had a very small leak causing a little wet place, where mosquitoes could leave larvae."
Eliminating tropical diseases was not only justified in terms of economic and political gains. Many speakers spoke to the new world that public health would help create. Representative Thatcher from Kentucky foresaw the time "somewhere in the future when this country will be filled to over-flowing with population . . . the southward countries constitute the natural outlet." Representative Hill praised Gorgas for having "opened the door for the white man to the treasures of the Tropics." Mrs. Gorgas stated that this was one of Gorgas' favorite subjects. He believed that "the tropics were far better adapted to civilization than the temperate zones. . . . Who ever saw more ruddy and vigorous children than the thousands who were at that moment swarming on the Isthmus, daily attending school, playing with all the heartiness and enjoyment of childhood?"
A certain naïveté prevailed at that time, one that dominated western thinking well through the first 50 years of the 20th century. Only in the 1950s did it become evident that disease held down the population growth of developing countries-so much so that there arose a legitimate fear that disease control, especially that of malaria, would lead to a population explosion, as was witnessed in Sri Lanka and parts of India when DDT was introduced to control malaria following World War II (Litsios 1997) . No longer could the "white man" hope to find population outlets in the tropics.A reversal had occurred, one that argued that such diseases must be controlled in the tropics not only to improve living conditions of the local population but also to prevent such diseases from entering into the temperate zones of the world.
Gorgas' approach no longer seems to inspire public health specialists. Only advocates of complete disease elimination look back with envy on what he managed to accomplish. But even they recognize that he was fortunate to have at his command an extraordinary network of human and material resources. In the first five years of its work, his department spent nearly 10 million dollars. Even today there are many developing countries that cannot afford that level of expenditure for all their health work for a comparable population size. As a consequence, malaria and several other 19th-century scourges remain major problems whose solution remains elusive (Litsios 2001b) .
Perhaps the most striking feature of this story is that Gorgas never received the full backing of those in charge of constructing the canal. Not only did they not believe in his methods, they seemed not to understand that yellow fever and malaria threatened the building of the canal. They begrudged every dollar that he managed to obtain to protect their workers. Had a really severe outbreak of yellow fever occurred and put a stop to construction work, then no doubt his efforts would have been lauded. But ironically, by preventing such outbreaks, his work remained unappreciated. Despite the public and official praise he received in the years following the opening of the canal, it cannot be claimed that the message "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" has gained much ground since.
